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Abstract—Crowds provides probable innocence in the face
of large number of attackers. In this paper, we present the
experimental results of the behavior of Crowds in a dense
network. We begin by providing a brief description about
Crowds followed by the experimental environment in which
the simulations were carried out. We then present the results
of our simulations and the inferences made out of them. We
will also show that the obtained results match the predictions
made by others.
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1. Introduction
Anonymous communication involves communicating
without revealing the identity to each other and to the
outside world. There are three types of anonymity namely
sender anonymity, receiver anonymity and the unlink-ability
of sender and receiver. Sender anonymity means that the
information about the sender will be hidden while the
receiver may not. Receiver anonymity on the other hand
hides the information about the receiver. Unlink-ability of
sender and receiver refers to the phenomenon that, both
the sender and the receiver may be found to involve in
communication but cannot be identified as communicating
with each other.
Many solutions exist to achieve anonymous communica-
tion over a network. They can be broadly classified under
three heads:
1) Web Proxies
2) Mix based systems
3) Other Communication systems.
In a proxy based system, additional trusted third parties
called proxy remain in between the sender and receiver.
Requests and responses go through this proxy, by which the
identities of the communicating parties are hidden. Some of
the available proxies for anonymous web browsing include:
Anonymizer [1], Proxify.com [2], and Proxy.org [3].
Mix based system was introduced by David Chaum in
1981 [4]. A mix in short is an enhanced proxy employing
public key cryptography to achieve anonymity. It hides the
sender’s identity by cryptographically altering the messages
being exchanged. Mixes utilize techniques such as buffering,
and circulation of dummy traffic during idle time, in order
to preclude an attacker from retrieving information about the
nature and the parties involved in a communication.
Other prominent communication systems include Onion
Routing [5] and Crowds. In Onion Routing, the sender builds
a virtual circuit by determining a path between it and the
receiver using layered objects called “Onions”. Every layer
in the layered object contains information about the session
key and next address of the node in the path. These onions
that travel down the path are unwrapped using the session
keys at each node. When the layers are fully removed, the
session keys are destroyed.
The final system of interest and also has been the subject
of analysis in this literature is the Crowd. They operate by
forming a large group of users who may be geographically
distributed. Crowds try to hide the actions of an individual
with in that group by forwarding the requests randomly be-
tween the members before sending it to the final destination.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows - section 2
provides a brief description about crowds, section 3 describes
the relevant literature review with respect to crowds research,
section 4 describes our simulation environment, section 5
presents the experimental results and the inferences drawn
from the data, and then we end this paper with conclusion
and future direction our research will take.
2. Crowds: A Brief Description
Crowds provide a mechanism for anonymous web brows-
ing. Though there were other systems such as mix nets and
DC-Nets [6] to accomplish the same, crowds were preferred
because of the low latency and less computational overhead.
Every member of the crowd runs a process named jondos
that registers itself with the central server called blender.
Every jondos knows about every other jondos in this ar-
chitecture. The blender is responsible for the distribution of
symmetric keys between every pair (jondos). When a request
for a web page begins at one of the nodes, the jondos running
in the originator node forwards the request to one of the
randomly chosen node by encrypting the message with the
corresponding symmetric key. The latter node then either
forward the same to another randomly selected node or to
the web sever. The decision is taken based on forwarding
probability with which it operates.
When a jondos receives a message, it does limited pro-
cessing to preclude certain attacks and continues to transmit
the message. The request and the response of the message
follow the same virtual path. These paths are torn down and
new paths are constructed on the regular basis whenever
Fig. 1: A Typical Crowd Architecture
there is a change of member count with in the crowd or
there is a node failure. A jondos cannot decide by itself, if
the request originated from the preceding node or the one
before it.
In this architecture, the adversary can observe the server
receiving messages. He/she cannot determine the source
of the message. Similarly, when the server transmits the
response back in the same path, it is difficult to ascertain
the final receiver. In addition, even if the attacker finds
that there are clients and servers communicating, he /she
cannot find out as to which client talks to which server.
Hence the anonymity goals that the crowds achieve include
sender anonymity, receiver anonymity and as well as the
unlink-ability of sender and receiver. However all of these
depend on the kind of attacker that we are talking about
while determining the anonymity. For example, there is no
sender anonymity against a local eaves dropper and, receiver
anonymity against the end server. In addition, none of these
anonymity schemes work against a global eavesdropper if
the scope of the crowd is only with in LAN. This in turn
necessitates spanning the crowd across multiple administra-
tive domains.
3. Literature Review
In this section we will provide brief descriptions and
summaries from literature significant in the domain of
crowds. Reiter and Rubin [7](Crowds: Anonymity for Web
Transactions), were the first to introduce the concept of
Crowds. They discussed the ways by which crowds can
be formed and operated. Measuring anonymity provided by
Crowds by employing the concept of degree of anonymity
was also discussed. Finally, it was proved that the expected
length of hop count for a message to reach the end server is
1
1−Pf
+ 1, and the expected participant payload in a crowd
of ‘n’ nodes is bounded by O( 1(1−Pf )2 ×(1+
1
n
)).Here Pf is
the forwarding probability. They also provided information
regarding design, implementation, security, performance and
scalability of the system.
The bounds for the participant payload proposed by Reiter
and Rubin was further improved in [8](The cost of becoming
anonymous: on the participant payload in Crowds). This
paper provides a precise formula that expected payload of a
participant also tends to 11−Pf + 1. In addition, the authors
also showed that participant payload in Crowds is entirely
independent of its size which in turn made evident that the
Crowds possess good scalability feature.
In [9] Towards measuring anonymity by Claudia, Stephen,
Joris and Bart, the author discusses about measuring the
degree of anonymity of systems including Crowd through
entropy H(X). In this literature, H(X) for Crowds is
measured as,
N−pf (N−C−1)
N
log2[
N
N−pf (N−C−1)
] + pf
N−C−1
N
log2[
N
pf
]
Here N , pf and C are the total number of crowd members,
probability of forwarding to the another member, total
number of collaborators respectively. This measure is in
addition to the suggestion made in [7] where the degree of
anonymity is defined as (1− Psender) where Psender is the
probability assigned by the attacker to a particular user.
Trust plays a major role in deciding your forwarder.
Hence Vladimiro, Ehab and Sardaouna in their paper titled
[10] Trust in Crowds: probabilistic behavior in anonymity
protocols, proposes a Crowds-Trust protocol that uses trust
information to achieve the desired level of anonymity. They
also derive expressions for different level of anonymity
required.
4. Simulation Environment
Network topology consisting of 2500 nodes was generated
using Georgia Tech Network Topology Generator (GT-ITM)
[11].The output of the same was converted to a understand-
able format using the utility sgb2alt that accompanies the
software. The output comprised of source,destination node
and the path length between them. The path length was
interpreted as delay in the simulation. This was followed by
computing the shortest path between all pairs of nodes using
Floyd-Warshall’s Algorithm [12]. This is how we generated
the network topology:
# <method keyword> <number of graphs> [<initial seed>]
# <n> <scale> <edgemethod> <alpha> [<beta>] [<gamma>]
geo 3
2500 2500 3 .03
Included here is a portion of the output that was generated
by the topology generator:
GRAPH (#nodes #edges id uu vv ww xx yy zz):
2500 188354 geo(0,{2500,2500,3,0.030,0.000,0.000}) 2500
VERTICES (index name u v w x y z):
0 0 805 682
1 1 1134 268
2 2 2181 925
3 3 1670 310
4 4 793 291
5 5 1747 917
6 6 220 945
7 7 183 1775
8 8 1236 2415
Crowd network was an overlay network on top of this
generated network. Hence although there remain direct con-
nections between two nodes in a Crowd network, the mes-
sage passes through numerous other nodes in the underlying
network before reaching the destination. The delay that was
precomputed at the end of topology generation was taken as
the delay between the nodes due to the underlying network
configuration. The simulations were run for different node
count and probabilities. Sampling of nodes that are part of
Crowd network for every simulation were generated from
the underlying topology using a randomized algorithm.
The simulator that we used, was written in Java and
ran on Linux machines. The server (blender) was started
and made to wait for a predefined period (specified in the
configuration file) to accept connections from the clients
(members interested in becoming part of the network).
At the end of this registration phase, every member was
provided information about itself and every other member.
The number of client processes to spawn, depending on the
node count, were performed using a batch file. These client
processes were ran on different machines. The parameters
for the client such as the probability with which to operate,
time at which to generate and send messages and as well as
the delay incurred in transmitting message to its successive
member were specified in the client configuration file. Every
scenario was run for 100 iterations and the data (hop count,
total delay) collected.
5. Experiments and Outcomes
The simulations were run for member counts ranging from
10 to 1000 with predefined intervals in between this range.
The forwarding probability was allowed to vary from 0.1 to
0.95. Measurements were taken after running every scenario
for 100 iterations.
The graphical outputs for some of the runs are presented
below. The graphs are plotted between the following param-
eters:
a Count of nodes participating in Crowd and delay
incurred in transferring message.
b Count of nodes participating in Crowd and the mea-
sured hop count.
Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 show the message transmission
delays incurred in milliseconds between the source and des-
tination when transmitted through the crowds network with
varying transmission probability and with crowds composed
of different node counts.
The next set of figures shows the hop count a message has
to travel before reaching the destination if sent through the
Fig. 2: Transmission delay for probability 0.95
Fig. 3: Transmission delay for probability 0.75
Fig. 4: Transmission delay for probability 0.55
Fig. 5: Transmission delay for probability 0.40
crowds network for networks composed of different number
Fig. 6: Transmission delay for probability 0.20
of node counts and with crowd node varying forwarding
probabilities.
Fig. 7: Number of hops traveled for probability 0.85
Figures 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 shows the experimental results
we collected for the parameters shown. Each experiment was
repeated 100 times and the average, median, and the standard
deviations have been plotted.
6. Results Interpretation
When the forwarding probability associated with the
nodes increased, the average hop count that the message took
to reach the destination increased and mostly followed the
derived entity 11−Pf + 1 except under very high probability.
This is clearly evident from the fact that the lesser the
likelihood of reaching the target, the more it takes to reach
it. Also since the crowds neither generate cover traffic nor
increase the work load of CPU by encrypting and decrypting
the content, the very slow increase of hop count for huge
increase in the member count is beneficial for community
adopting this service.
Though the hop count is minimum,the delay is more since
the hop count overlooks the underlying nodes in between the
member nodes.As the result, this service cannot be adopted
for systems that require faster response.The delay in the
response may not be acceptable for interacting users even
for queries such as the one that provides some location
information.
Fig. 8: Number of hops traveled for probability 0.65
Fig. 9: Number of hops traveled for probability 0.50
Fig. 10: Number of hops traveled for probability 0.30
Fig. 11: Number of hops traveled for probability 0.10
The standard deviation of the hop count increased on
increasing probability. The standard deviation of the hop
count decreased on increasing the number of nodes for the
same probability. The hop count increases gradually for
every increase in probability except at above 0.9 where there
is a huge increase in the hop count.
Crowds neither generate cover traffic nor increase the
work load of CPU caused due to a series of encryption
and decryption. The encryption and decryption performed
using path key is very minimal in Crowds. Hence they
are preferred over mix nets and onion routing specially in
situations where security of the content is not of prime
importance. From the simulations, it is observed that the
hop count increases very slowly and reaches the value 8
until the probability value hit 0.85, after which it increases
drastically even for the large number of nodes. This seems
to be reasonable in the light of the service that it provides.
Although Crowd is meant to provide efficient service, the
delay associated in sending a message to the destination is
significant. This is evident from the graphs above where
delay value is quite high even for minimum node count.
7. Conclusion
This paper provides the experimental results that we
carried out to validate the operation of a crowd anonymity
network. We have described our simulation strategy and
provided the results we got. The results are in line with
theoretical predictions made in several of the pioneering
work in this field. In the very near future, we are planning on
analyzing crowds and the degree of anonymity it provides by
incorporating it within a utility function that would include
the notion of cost versus degree of anonymity, transmission
delay and other relevant parameters. It is still a work in
progress and would take some time before we can comment
on the strategy here in this paper. We are also planning on
using the same utility function to compare other anonymity
schemes such as onion routing, mix nets, etc.
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